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TAX COLLECTION-WHERE ONE CODEPOSITOR IN A JOINT 
BANK ACCOUNT FAILS TO PAY FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MAY LEVY ON THE AC-
COUNT WITHOUT NOTICE TO INNOCENT CODEPOSITORS, 
PROVIDED THE DELINQUENT TAXPAYER HAS AN ABSO-
LUTE RIGHT UNDER STATE LAW TO WITHDRAW FUNDS 
FROM THE JOINT ACCOUNT. United States v. National Bank of 
Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985). 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed an Arkansas resident 
for federal income taxes, penalties, and interest. 1 The delinquent tax-
payer shared a checking account and savings account with his wife and 
his mother at an Arkansas bank. The contract with the bank authorized 
all three to make withdrawals from either account. Pursuant to section 
6331 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), the IRS served a notice of 
levy on the bank demanding payment of the unpaid taxes.2 The bank 
refused to comply with the levy because it could not identify which por-
tion of deposited money belonged to the delinquent taxpayer and which 
to the other codepositors. 3 The United States brought an action seeking 
judgment against the bank under section 6332 of the Code for the 
amount of the assessment.4 
1. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919, 2922 (1985). The 
taxpayer was assessed a total amount of $3,607.45. As a result of payments and 
credits, the amount owing was reduced to $856.61. Id. 
2. Jd. at 2922. I.R.C. § 6331 (1982) provides: 
LEVY AND DISTRAINT. 
(a) Authority of Secretary-If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or 
refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be 
lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall 
be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property 
and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under§ 6334) 
belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chap-
ter for payment of such tax. 
(b) Seizure and Sale of Property -The term "levy" as used in this title 
includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means. Except as other-
wise provided in subsection (d)(3), a levy shall extend only to property 
possessed and obligations existing at the time thereof. In any case in which 
the Secretary may levy upon property or rights to property, he may seize 
and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, 
tangible or intangible). 
I.R.C. § 6331 (1982). 
3. National Bank, lOS S. Ct. at 2922. 
4. Id. The text of I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982) provides in part: 
SURRENDER OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LEVY. 
(a) Requirement -(A]ny person in possession of (or obligated with re-
spect to) property or rights to property subject to levy upon which a levy 
has been made shall, upon demand of the Secretary, surrender such prop-
erty or rights (or discharge such obligation) to the Secretary, except such 
part of the property or rights as is, at the time of such demand, subject to 
an attachment or execution under any judicial process. 
I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982). A bank which refuses to comply with an IRS notice oflevy 
and demand for payment may be subject to a penalty of 50% of the amount sought 
by the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6332(c)(2) (1982). In deciding whether to impose a pen-
alty, lower courts have considered whether there exists a bona fide dispute to the 
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkan-
sas granted the bank's motion to dismiss, holding that the IRS failed to 
meet minimum procedural due process requirements. 5 The court held 
that the IRS must identify and notify the codepositors, and provide them 
with an opportunity to be heard.6 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, 7 but not upon constitutional grounds. 
Relying on principles of statutory construction, the court held that 
before a levy is permitted the IRS must determine the actual value of the 
taxpayer's interest in the joint account to demonstrate that the bank is in 
possession of property belonging to the taxpayer.8 The court ruled that 
the IRS could not prevail without negating or quantifying the claims of 
the codepositors.9 On certiorari, a sharply divided Supreme Court re-
versed.10 The majority recognized that the taxpayer's absolute right 
under state law to withdraw funds deposited in the joint accounts created 
"property or rights to property" within the meaning of section 6321 of 
the Code. 11 Consequently, the accounts in their entirety were subject to 
administrative levy.12 
The United States Constitution provides the federal government 
with the authority to levy and collect taxes. 13 Pursuant to this general 
authority, the United States Congress enacted a statute in 1791 authoriz-
ing the seizure and sale of property owned by manufacturers of distilled 
spirits who failed to pay excise taxes. 14 Similar legislation permitted the 
seizure and sale of property whose owners failed to pay property tax15 
property such that the bank acted with good cause in refusing payment. See United 
States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y., 494 F.2d 919 (2nd Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977). If a bank does comply with a notice of levy and demand 
for payment by the IRS, the bank is not liable to the depositors in the accounts. 
Compliance with IRS demands is an absolute defense from any action against the 
bank by the depositors. See Sebel v. Lytton Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 65-1 USTC 11 
9343 (S.D. Cal. 1965). 
5. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. 110, 114-15 (E.D. Ark. 
1982). 
6. Id. 
7. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 726 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1984). 
8. Jd. at 1293. The court acknowledged that the taxpayer could have withdrawn any 
amount he wished from the account and used it to pay his debts, including his 
unpaid taxes, but rejected the government's contention that the IRS stood in the 
shoes of the taxpayer and could act as he could with respect to the accounts. I d. at 
1295-96. 
9. ld. 
10. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985) (5-4 decision). 
11. Jd. at 2926. 
12. Id. 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and 
Excises shall be unifoim throughout the United States." 
14. 1 Stat. 199, 204 (1791). See also 3 Stat. 152, 154 (1814) (reenacting a similar 
statute). 
15. 3 Stat. 164, 173 (1815). 
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and permitted the seizure and sale of goods from manufacturers who 
failed to pay tax upon those goods. 16 The present federal tax lien statute 
is codified in section 6321 of the Code and resembles the first federal tax 
lien statute17 enacted by Congress in 1865,18 which was amended in 
1866. 19 
Under section 6321 of the Code, a tax lien arises in favor of the 
United States when a taxpayer fails to pay any tax owed to the federal 
government. 20 Although the lien attaches to all property or rights to 
property belonging to the taxpayer,21 it does not contain an enforcement 
provision. The IRS must take affirmative action under one of two Code 
sections to collect the unpaid taxes.22 Section 7403 authorizes the IRS to 
institute a lien foreclosure suit,23 and section 6331 empowers the IRS to 
16. 3 Stat. 180, 182 (1815). 
17. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). See Oppenheim, Federal Tax Liens: Evolution and Conflict 
with State Liens, 4 DuQ. L. REv. 495, 496 (1965-66). 
18. 13 Stat. 469, 470 (1865). This statute was an amendment to a statute enacted in 
1864. The 1864 statute provided for distraint of property, but did not impose a lien 
on the property. See 13 Stat. 223, 233 (1864). See generally Kennedy, The Relative 
Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and Gen-
eral Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 919-20 (1954) (indicating a reason for the enactment of 
the first tax lien: "The need for a lien to secure the Government's tax claims, irre-
spective of the taxpayer's solvency, became apparent as federal fiscal requirements 
expanded during the Civil War and tax collections were increasingly defeated by a 
transfer of the taxpayer's assets before institution of enforcement proceedings."). 
19. 14 Stat. 98, 107 (1866). This statute was an amendment to both the statute in 1864 
and its amendment in 1865. See supra note 18. It provided that if any person was 
liable to pay tax and, after notice refused: 
[T]he amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States from the time it 
was due until paid, with the interest, penalties, and costs that may accrue 
in addition thereto, upon all property and rights to property belonging to 
such person ... and the collector, after demand, may levy, and by warrant 
may authorize a deputy collector to levy upon all property and rights to 
property belonging to such person . . . . 
14 Stat. at 107. 
20. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). The statute provides: 
LIEN FOR TAXES. 
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after 
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition 
to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in 
addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all 
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, tangible or in-
tangible, belonging to such person. 
I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). See also Oppenheim supra note 17, at 496 ("[B]efore a federal 
tax lien arises, three conditions must be fullfilled. There must be an assessment, a 
demand, and a neglect or refusal to pay tax."). 
21. Id. 
22. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 682 (1983). 
23. I.R.C. § 7403 (1982) provides in part: 
ACTION TO ENFORCE LIEN OR TO SUBJECT PROPERTY TO 
PAYMENT OF TAX. 
(a) Filing- In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay 
any tax or to discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy 
has been made, the Attorney General or his delegate, at the request of the 
Secretary, may direct a civil action to be filed in a district court of the 
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employ an administrative levy.24 Both procedures ensure the prompt 
and certain enforcement of the tax laws, 25 but differ in their treatment of 
third parties who have a joint interest in the delinquent taxpayer's 
property. 26 
Under the lien foreclosure suit, the court is authorized to seize and 
sell a delinquent taxpayer's property to satisfy a tax debt. 27 All persons 
with an interest in the seized property must be made parties to the suit. 28 
The court is empowered to determine the merits of the claims of all par-
ties involved, order the sale of such property, and provide for the proper 
distribution of the proceeds of the sale. 29 The lien foreclosure suit pro-
tects third parties with an interest in the property from an unsuspected 
lien on the property by the IRS. The lien foreclosure action also benefits 
the IRS by providing the highest ·return possible on the forced sale of 
seized property. 3o 
Under the administrative levy, the IRS may seize and sell a delin-
quent taxpayer's property to satisfy a tax debt.3 1 The IRS must notify 
the delinquent taxpayer of the tax liability and demand payment. 32 Ten 
days after notification, the IRS can levy all property owned by the tax-
payer whether or not that property is owned jointly with a third party.33 
If the property is in the possession of a third party, then the third party 
United States to enforce the lien of the United States under this title with 
respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, of whatever 
nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to 
the payment of such tax or liability. 
(b) Parties- All persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the 
property involved in such action shall be made parties thereto. 
(c) Adjudication and decree- The court shall, after the parties have been 
duly notified of the action, proceed to adjudicate all matters involved 
therein and finally determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the 
property, and, in all cases where a claim or interest of the United States 
therein is established, may decree a sale of such property, by the proper 
officer of the court, and a distribution of the proceeds of such sales accord-
ing to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and 
of the United States. 
I.R.C. § 7403 (1982). 
24. For the text of I.R.C. § 6331 (1982), see supra note 2. There are a number of ex-
emptions listed in § 6334 of the Code which describe property upon which a levy 
cannot attach. These exemptions are basically necessaries, which include clothing, 
books, personal effects, unemployment benefits, undelivered mail, pensions, work-
men's compensation, and child support payments. I.R.C. § 6334 (1982). 
25. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 683. 
26. A third method of collecting unpaid taxes available to the IRS is a common law 
creditor action which gives the IRS the rights of a judgment creditor. This note 
does not discuss the rights of the federal government as an ordinary judgment 
creditor. 
27. I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1982). See supra note 23. 
28. I.R.C. § 7403(b) (1982). 
29. I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1982). 
30. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 699. 
31. I.R.C. § 6331(b) (1982). 
32. I.R.C. § 6331(d)(l) (1982). 
33. I.R.C. §§ 6331(a), 6332(a) (1982). See supra notes 2 and 4. 
194 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
must surrender the property to the IRS upon demand. 34 In contrast to 
the lien foreclosure suit, the administrative levy does not require judicial 
intervention,35 nor does it require notice to anyone with an interest in the 
property other than the delinquent taxpayer. Although the administra-
tive levy provides the IRS with a quick and inexpensive device for col-
lecting federal taxes,36 it leaves third parties with an interest in the levied 
property with the burden of protecting their ownership interests in post-
seizure actions. 37 
Before the IRS can avail itself of either the lien foreclosure suit or 
the administrative levy, there must be a federal tax lien upon the tax-
payer's property.38 A lien may only attach to property owned by the 
taxpayer. 39 Thus, regardless of the remedy pursued by the IRS, the 
threshold question is whether and to what extent the taxpayer has prop-
erty or rights to property. 
In United States v. Bess,40 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the IRS could impose an administrative levy upon the pro-
ceeds of life insurance policies.41 The Court held that the IRS could not 
attach the proceeds of the insurance policies, but that it could recover the 
cash surrender value of the policies.42 The Court stated that the Code 
does not create property rights, but merely attaches federally defined 
consequences to property rights created by state law.43 Under state law 
the taxpayer in Bess had no right to the proceeds of the policies, but he 
could have compelled payment of the cash surrender value of the poli-
cies.44 The Court concluded that the taxpayer's right to the cash surren-
der value of the policies constituted property or rights to property which 
was subject to seizure under an administrative levy.45 The beneficiary 
argued that the IRS could not levy even on the cash surrender value of 
the policy because the proceeds of the policy were beyond the reach of a 
creditor's lien under state law.46 The Court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that state law cannot prevent the operation of a federal tax lien once a 
property right is determined.47 The Court also noted that property not 
expressly exempted from the operation of a federal tax lien by the Code48 
34. I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982). See supra note 4. 
35. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 682-83. 
36. /d. at 699. 
37. I.R.C. §§ 6343, 7426 (1982). See infra note 68. 
38. I.R.C. §§ 6331(a), 7403(a) (1982). 
39. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). 
40. 357 u.s. 51 (1958). 
41. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 52 (1958). The estate reduced the indebtedness 
to approximately $9,000. /d. 
42. /d. at 55-57. 
43. /d. at 55. 
44. /d. at 56. 
45. /d. 
46. /d. 
47. /d. at 56-57. 
48. /d. at 57. For a list of exempted property, see supra note 24. 
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could not be judicially exempted.49 
Two years later, in Aquilino v. United States, 50 the Court articulated 
the respective roles of state and federal law. The Court emphasized that 
in cases involving federal tax liens the first issue is whether the taxpayer 
has property or rights to property upon which a lien can attach.51 This 
issue is determined according to state law because of the "legitimate and 
traditional interest which the state has in creating and defining the prop-
erty interests of its citizens."52 Once a property interest is found, the 
Court stated that state law is no longer applicable. The application of 
federal law to property interests created by state law ensures "a uniform 
administration of the federal revenue statutes."53 
Neither Bess nor Aquilino determined whether a federal tax lien 
could attach to jointly held property to satisfy the tax debt of one of the 
joint owners. In Babb v. Schmidt, 54 the Ninth Circuit upheld the use of 
an administrative levy upon joint bank accounts belonging to a husband 
and a wife to satisfy the tax obligations of the husband. 55 The Third 
Circuit earlier had reached a contrary result in Raffaele v. Granger. 56 In 
Raffaele, the court focused not on whether the codepositor had the right 
to withdraw the full amount of the bank accounts, but rather on whether, 
under state law, the accounts which are owned jointly by a husband and 
wife are considered to be held in tenancy by the entireties and therefore 
49. /d. See also United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 205 (1971) (stating in regard to 
the language of the exception provision of § 6334: "This language is specific and it 
is clear and there is no room in it for automatic exemption of property that happens 
to be exempt from state levy under state law."). 
50. 363 u.s. 509 (1960). 
51. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512 (1960). 
52. /d. at 514. 
53. /d. The Court considered whether an IRS administrative tax levy on the property 
interest of a general contractor in a construction contract had priority over a 
mechanic's lien against the contract filed by subcontractor. /d. at 510-22. The sub-
contractor argued that under New York law the amount due to the general contrac-
tor from the owner constituted "trust funds" in the hands of the general contractor 
for the benefit of subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen and that the general 
contractor thus had no property rights in the fund to which the IRS's levy could 
attach. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the IRS and the Court of 
Appeals of New York affirmed. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment because the Court of Appeals of New York had not determined clearly what 
property or rights to property the general contractor had in the fund under state 
law. /d. at 515-16. The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals of New 
York for a determination of the nature of property interests of the general contrac-
tor in the fund. /d. at 513-14. 
54. 496 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1974). 
55. /d. at 959. The court did not focus on whether the husband had any property or 
rights to property in the accounts under state law, but rather on whether the wife's 
property could be used to satisfy the husband's debts under state law. 
Other cases have held that a joint bank account may be levied to satisfy taxes 
owed by one codepositor. See, e.g., Riollano v. District Director of Internal Reve-
nue, 197 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank & Trust 
Co., 111 F. Supp. 152 (M.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 49 
A.F.T.R.2d ~ 82-484 (D. Md. 1981). 
56. 196 F.2d 620 (3rd Cir. 1952). 
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not subject to creditors' claims. 57 The court determined that, under 
Pennsylvania law, a joint bank account was a "single personality" which 
was not subject to attachment by creditors of one of the codepositors. 58 
Expressing concern that the IRS was attempting to take property belong-
ing to one person to satisfy the tax obligation of another, 59 the court held 
that a tax levy upon a joint bank account was not permitted.60 Similar 
concern for the rights of nondeliquent codepositors led the Eighth Cir-
cuit to deny the IRS the right to levy the joint accounts in United States 
v. National Bank of Commerce. 6l 
On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower 
courts. 62 Consistent with Bess and Aquilino, the Court found that the 
taxpayer's absolute right under state law to withdraw funds from the 
accounts created property or rights to property in the entire account. 63 
The Court held that upon the tax default of one codepositor, 64 the joint 
accounts were subject to federal .tax lien provisions without proof that 
the delinquent taxpayer had complete ownership of the accounts. 65 The 
Court also held that the IRS was not required to provide notice of the tax 
lien to the codepositors because under the administrative levy there is no 
57. Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620, 622 (3rd Cir. 1952). The court's focus in Raf-
faele was misplaced. The issue was not whether the property was subject to credi-
tors' claims under state law, but rather whether the taxpayer had property or rights 
to property in the bank account. Because the taxpayer did have the right to with-
draw money from this account, he had a right to property in the account under state 
law. Once it is determined that the taxpayer has a property right under state law, 
state law consequences become irrelevant and federal law controls as to tax conse-
quences. The property should have been subject to the federal tax lien. See supra 
notes 43-53 and accompanying text. 
58. Raffaele, 196 F.2d at 622. 
59. /d. at 623. Even courts which have allowed the use of a federal tax lien upon jointly 
held property have demonstrated concern for the rights of the nondelinquent code-
positor. These courts have gone to great lengths to justify the lien instead of simply 
determining whether the delinquent taxpayer had property or rights to property in 
the property seized. See, e.g., United States v. Millikin, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
~ 9641 (M.D.N.C. 1962) (After determining that the husband was the sole source of 
the funds used to purchase the bonds, the court held that United States savings 
bonds owned jointly by a husband, wife, and their daughter were subject to levy to 
satisfy the husband's tax debts.). 
60. 196 F.2d at 622-23. 
61. 726 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1984). 
62. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919, 2927 (1985). 
63. /d. at 2926. 
64. /d. at 2927, 2931. The right of the codepositor-taxpayer to withdraw the full 
amount in the joint accounts was based on the taxpayer's contract with the bank 
and on an Arkansas statute. /d. at 2926. Under Arkansas law, a bank account is 
not subject to creditor's liens. /d. at 2925-26. As in Bess and Aquilino, however, 
state law exemptions are inoperable once the court determines that the taxpayer has 
property or rights to property in the accounts. /d. at 2927-28. Thus, the Court in 
National Bank indicated that the lower courts had applied state law inappropriately. 
/d. at 2927. Once state law defines the nature of the interest which the taxpayer has 
in the property, federal law dictates the tax consequences to the state law right. /d. 
at 2928. 
65. /d. at 2927. 
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requirement of notice to the innocent codepositor.66 
The Court addressed the lower courts' concern for the third parties 
who share in the ownership of joint accounts and whose interest might be 
affected by a tax lien. 67 The Court noted that Congress has provided 
remedies for third parties seeking to protect their property interests. 68 
The Court deferred to the congressional scheme, stating that Congress 
had balanced the government's interest in the prompt collection of taxes 
against the claimant's interest in the property.69 Congress reconciled 
these interests by permitting the IRS to levy on the property immedi-
ately, leaving disputes over ownership to be resolved in post-seizure ad-
66. ld. at 2926. The Court noted that a bank's only two possible defenses for refusal to 
comply with a demand for payment by the IRS are that the property is subject to 
prior judicial attachment or that the bank is not in possession of the property sub-
ject to the tax lien. ld. at 2925. 
67. Id. at 2928. 
68. ld. at 2928. One remedy is to seek an administrative review within nine months of 
the date of the notice of levy. I.R.C. § 6343(b) (1982). See also Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.6343-1(b)(2) (1984). I.R.C. § 6343(b) (1982) provides: 
Authority to release levy and return property 
(a) Release of Levy- It shall be lawful for the Secretary, under regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary, to release the levy upon all or part of the 
property or rights to property levied upon where the Secretary determines 
that such action will facilitate the collection of the liability, but such re-
lease shall not operate to prevent any subsequent levy. 
(b) Return of Property - If the Secretary determines that property has 
been wrongfully levied upon, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to 
return-
( I) the specific property levied upon, 
(2) an amount of money equal to the amount of money levied upon, 
or 
(3) an amount of money equal to the amount of money received by 
the United States from the sale of such property. 
Property may be returned at any time. An amount equal to the amount of 
money levied upon or received from such sale may be returned at any time 
before the expiration of 9 months of the date of such levy . . . . 
(c) Interest shall be allowed and paid at an annual rate established under 
section 6621 .... 
I.R.C. § 6343(b) (1982). A second remedy is that a party claiming an interest in 
property may bring a civil action against the United States to have the property 
returned. I.R.C. § 7426 (1982). This section reads in part: 
Civil actions by persons other than taxpayers 
(a) Actions permitted-
(1) Wrongful levy - If a levy has been made on property or property 
has been sold pursuant to a levy, any person (other than the 
person against whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy 
arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and 
that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil 
action against the United States in a district court of the United 
States. Such action may be brought without regard to other 
such property which has been surrendered to or sold by the Sec-
retary .... 
I.R.C. § 7426 (1982). 
69. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2929. 
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ministrative or judicial proceedings.7° Finally, the Court reasoned that if 
the IRS were required to notify third parties and include them in collec-
tion proceedings, there would be no practical distinction between the ad-
ministrative levy and the lien foreclosure suit.71 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, joined by three other jus-
tices, argued that both prior decisions and the rights of third parties com-
pelled a decision against the IRS. 72 In comparing the lien foreclosure 
suit and the administrative levy, the dissent urged that only the lien fore-
closure suit permitted the IRS to seize property in which a delinquent 
taxpayer had a partial interest. 73 In contrast, the administrative levy 
could be employed only where the taxpayer had full ownership of the 
property levied. 74 The dissent concluded that the levy in this case was 
improper because the IRS did not demonstrate that the bank held prop-
erty "completely" belonging to the delinquent taxpayer.75 
70. /d. 
71. /d. at 2931. The Court noted that such a rule could eliminate the use of the admin-
istrative levy altogether. ld. The Supreme Court did not address the constitutional 
issues concerning notice to third parties, but noted that the parties were free to 
address this issue on remand. /d. at 2929 n.12. On remand, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit refused to enforce the levy against the bank, and remanded 
the case to the district court to resolve the issue of notice. United States v. National 
Bank of Commerce, 772 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1985). On remand, the case was dis-
missed as moot because the tax debt had been paid. United States v. National Bank 
of Commerce, 775 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1985). Therefore, whether notice must be 
given to nondelinquent codepositors of joint bank accounts is unresolved. 
The statutory post-seizure remedies may satisfy due process. The Court has 
stated that "[t]he fundamental requirement ofdue process is the opportunity to be 
heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'." Matthews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
In Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), the Court demonstrated that rem-
edies which are available after the seizure of property can comport with due process 
mandates. In Phillips, the government assessed taxes and penalties against the 
shareholders in a dissolved corporation and utilized administrative proceedings to 
collect the taxes. /d. at 595. The Court noted that where property rights alone are 
involved, postponement of the judicial inquiry does not deny due process if the op-
portunity for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate. /d. at 
596-97. National Bank implies that the post-seizure remedies are adequate. See 
supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. Although National Bank and Phillips 
indicate that the post-seizure remedies available to third parties may be sufficient to 
meet due process requirements neither address the issue of notice, and the facts in 
Phillips did not involve third parties. 
72. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2932 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
73. /d. at 2933. 
74. /d. 
75. /d. at 2935. The majority rejected this contention by asserting that the word "com-
pletely" is not part of the statute. /d. at 2929-30 n.14. Further, the majority stated 
that "collection provisions plainly contemplate that a taxpayer's interest in the 
property may be less than full ownership. The tax lien attaches not only to 'prop-
erty', but also to 'rights to property'." /d. at 2929-30. 
The dissent relied upon Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U.S. 326 
(1890), and United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983), to support the proposi-
tion that only property completely belonging to a delinquent taxpayer may be sub-
ject to an administrative levy. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2932-35 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). These cases were distinguished by the majority. /d. at 2930 n.15. 
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Like the majority, the dissent looked to state law to determine the 
nature of the delinquent taxpayer's interests in the property seized. The 
dissent found that under state law the taxpayer legally could not possess 
the funds of others, 76 and that the right to withdraw all of the funds from 
the accounts was not sufficient alone as a basis for allowing an adminis-
trative levy.77 The dissent reasoned that the majority's holding permits 
the IRS to levy on a joint account even though it knew that under state 
law the funds in the joint account did not belong to the delinquent 
taxpayer. 78 
National Bank supports the legitimate interest of the government in 
the enforcement of its tax laws. It is also consistent with the Court's 
prior decisions in Bess 19 and Aquilino.80 The Court in National Bank, 
however, failed to carefully consider the adverse impact on the nondelin-
quent codepositor of a joint bank account.81 The Court stated that the 
administrative levy, unlike a lien foreclosure suit, does not implicate the 
rights of third parties. 82 This conclusion assumes that third parties will 
bring post-seizure actions. The innocent codepositor may not bring a 
post-seizure action, however, for two reasons. First, the innocent code-
positor may not know that the joint account has been seized because 
there is no notice requirement to third parties under an administrative 
levy. 83 Second, even if he were made aware of the levy, the innocent 
codepositor may not pursue a post-seizure remedy because the loss in-
curred might be less than the anticipated expense of the remedy. There-
fore, the majority's contention that third party rights are not implicated 
Mansfield involved the use of a levy in which the court held that the government 
may not levy upon a leasehold interest and then sell a fee interest. Id. at 2934 
(Powell, J., dissenting). The majority asserted that this case stood for the proposi-
tion that the government cannot sell a totally different interest than it levied upon. 
/d. at 2931 n.l5. Rodgers did not involve the use of the administrative levy, but 
rather the lien foreclosure suit. /d. at 2930. Nevertheless, the Court contrasted the 
two remedies and stated that the administrative levy does not require notice and 
hearing to third parties because their rights are not intended to be implicated. Com-
pare id. at 2934 (Powell, J., dissenting) with Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 696. The majority 
stated that the decision in National Bank is consistent with Rodgers because the 
administrative levy does not determine any rights to the property. It functions to 
protect the government's interests so that rights to the property may be determined 
in a post-seizure proceeding. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2930. 
76. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2933 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
77. /d. at 2935. 
78. /d. at 2937-38 nn.9-10. The dissent also stated that the administrative levy could 
hardly be characterized as provisional because the burden to bring postseizure ac-
tions is on third parties. Id. at 2938-39. 
Another area of concern raised by the dissent was that the majority's holding 
will be applicable to other forms of joint property. /d. at 2939. However, this con-
cern was dispelled because the majority expressly stated that the holding is limited 
to joint bank accounts. /d. at 2927, n.10. 
79. 357 U.S. 51 (1958). See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. 
80. 363 U.S. 509 (1960). See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
81. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2928-29. 
82. /d. at 2930 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 696 (1983)). 
83. Id. at 2930. 
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is inaccurate insofar as it ignores the potential adverse effect to innocent 
third parties. 
The Court stated that third parties are not joined in administrative 
levy proceedings, as they are in lien foreclosure suits, because joining 
third parties in an administrative levy proceeding would be uneconomi-
cal. 84 This conclusion suggests that the administrative levy should be 
used for the collection of small sums of unpaid taxes and the lien foreclo-
sure suit for larger amounts. The Code does not limit the use of the 
administrative levy to disputes involving relatively small monetary 
amounts. 85 If the Court, or Congress, were to specify a maximum dollar 
amount for administrative levy proceeqings, innocent third parties would 
be protected from the danger of a government levy on large property 
interests in actions where third parties would not be joined 
automatically. 
Maryland law is similar to Arkansas law in that a person who is a 
party to a joint bank account may withdraw all of the funds in that ac-
count. 86 Therefore, a joint bank account in Maryland constitutes prop-
erty or rights to property upon which a federal tax lien may attach. As in 
National Bank, a joint bank account in Maryland may be seized by the 
IRS without notification to an innocent codepositor. 
National Bank affirms the importance of providing the IRS with an 
effective, prompt, and stringent means of tax collection. 87 The Court's 
holding that a bank account may be levied upon, even when jointly held, 
is consistent with the scheme of the Internal Revenue Code to promote 
the efficient collection of taxes. Although the government's compelling 
interest in collecting taxes may be paramount to the rights of innocent 
third parties who hold property jointly with delinquent taxpayers, 
greater protection should be afforded such third parties to avoid poten-
tially harsh results. 
Stephen S. McCloskey 
84. /d. at 2931. 
85. In Rodgers, the IRS used a lien foreclosure suit for the collection of taxes owed in 
the amount of $900,000.00. In National Bank, the IRS used an administrative levy 
for the collection of $856.61. Although these cases indicate that the lien foreclosure 
suit is used for large dollar amounts, it is unclear where the cutoff is. For example, 
in United States v. Sterling Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y., 494 F.2d 919 (2nd Cir. 
1974), the IRS used an administrative levy to seek collection of taxes owed in the 
amount of $15,531.25. 
86. See Haneke v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 98, 108 (D. Md. 1975); Scott v. Bow-
man, 253 Md. 55, 58, 251 A.2d 598, 599 (1969); Sody v. Sody, 32 Md. App. 644, 
652-53, 363 A.2d 568, 573-74 (1976); United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 49 
A.F.T.R.2d ~IT 82-428, 82-725 (D. Md. 1982). See also MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-303 (1980) ("If a deposit in a banking institution is made in the names of two or 
more persons and is payable to any one of them ... [t]he money in the account may 
be withdrawn by any person named on the account .... "). 
87. "[T]axes ·are the life blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability 
an imperious need." Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935). 
